Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Myles F. Burnyeat, Baruch Brody and Jos A. Benardete

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]